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I. INTRODUCTION: A RANGE OF STRONG CRITIQUES   
RAISING BASIC ISSUES 
This essay responds to some major critiques of my work on the religion 
clauses.  The effort has seemed worth undertaking because many issues 
the critics raise lie at the core of one’s approach to free exercise and
nonestablishment, and some of those issues matter greatly for
constitutional adjudication more broadly.  Like any author, perhaps, my
reaction to reading some comments has been that I did not quite say that,
but I shall not bore you with these quibbles about how well I explained 
myself in the past.  Rather, I shall try to confront the genuinely basic 
questions that many of the comments raise.  My aim is less to persuade
the reader that my positions are right, or better than alternatives, than to
explain what the positions are and why I hold them. 
Most critics have thought that in exploring specific issues involving
the religion clauses I do a reasonable job of explaining what is at stake
and presenting competing arguments.  The criticisms begin from there, 
and the most fundamental of these connect in various ways. 
Rather than starting out with a grand theory, I undertake a “bottom-
up” strategy of looking at various crucial issues.  I believe that for both 
free exercise and establishment a number of central values need to be
considered and accommodated.  Although in some areas I move from 
these central values to fairly straightforward precepts that should govern 
decisions in particular cases, in other domains my suggestions involve 
substantial balancing and roughly approximate looking at the totality of
circumstances.  My approach does not rest on any particular religious or 
other comprehensive view, such as utilitarianism.  Indeed, I claim that
courts, and the government as a formal entity more generally, should not 
rely on any conclusion about religious truth.1 
Here are some of the critiques.  Although I present reasons for competing 
positions, I tend to settle for one conclusion rather than another without
providing a reasonable basis for doing so.  Steven Smith has written that
1. A significant clarification to this sentence as it is written is that I believe it is 
appropriate for legislators to rely on their religious convictions in adopting legislation— 
say to aid the poor or extend health care—that does not itself promote a particular
religious perspective.  What I have in mind is the kind of influence described about the 
late Senator Edward Kennedy.  My views on this topic are summarized in 2 KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 497– 
524 (2008). 
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I am disconcertingly complacent, almost disdainful, about reason’s 
requirements, that I make “bald,” “highly conclusory pronouncements.”2 
Part of the problem involves the constraints of secular discourse under
which I operate.  Were theorists to engage central premises about religion, 
they would not suffer quite the disabilities of those who try to reason 
without relying on such premises.  A closely related criticism is that one 
should not simply put aside the truth or value of religion when 
interpreting the religion clauses.
The origins of free exercise and nonestablishment are said to rest on 
religious convictions, and perhaps the soundest justifications still lie 
there.  One needs to address this possibility directly.  Moreover, one 
needs to consider if religion is distinctively valuable, whether or not the 
evaluation comes from a religious perspective.  I fail on both fronts, the 
criticism alleges, despite having a chapter entitled “Justifications for the 
Religion Clauses.”3 
These questions about the place of religious premises connect to the 
status of original meaning.  I reject originalism as a complete approach
but without providing a systematic alternative or explaining in detail just 
how far original understanding matters for resolving issues about the 
religion clauses.4 
Other critics, although not challenging the strategy of proceeding
without reliance on any overarching religious or comprehensive view, 
other critics find my approaches to bases for judicial decisions unsatisfying 
for pragmatic reasons, mainly because they provide too little guidance 
for judges.  Approaches that take into account multiple considerations 
without any clear direction about order and weight are simply unworkable; 
they leave courts with too much discretion to fill in a broad range of 
indeterminacy.5  Related to this critique are claims that, given my own 
views, I cannot convincingly reject what I take as a more radical and 
2. See Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious 
Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1872, 1893 (2009) (book review). 
3. Id. at 1897.  Paul Horwitz suggests in a forthcoming book, Constitutional 
Agnosticism, that that stance is the best approach, which he explains as differing from 
putting aside questions of religious truth.  PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW,
RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (Oxford Univ. Press forthcoming 2011).
4. Id. at 1898–1903. 
5. See Richard W. Garnett, Judicial Enforcement of the Establishment Clause, 25 
CONST. COMMENT. 273 (2008); Paul Horwitz, The Philosopher’s Brief, 25 CONST.
COMMENT. 285 (2008). 
 1133
















   
   












thoroughgoing skepticism.6  Further, I am mistaken in asserting that 
Supreme Court decisions about religion are less incoherent than is often
claimed.7 
The two obvious alternatives to my kind of contextualized approach 
are (1) judges making decisions according to a few basic rules, ones that
do not require highly nuanced judgments and (2) judges extending very
great deference to the political branches.8  One way of conceiving the 
latter possibility is that the constitutional norms themselves would be 
understood as being broader than what is judicially enforceable.9  Take 
Employment Division v. Smith, which held that when a law is neutral and 
generally applicable, religious claimants have no free exercise right to 
any exemption, no matter how severe the imposition on religious practice
and no matter how modest the state’s interest in curbing the practice.10 
In that case, the Supreme Court refused to consider an exemption for the 
Native American Church to use peyote as the very center of its worship 
services.11  One way to conceive the decision, a way that does not accord 
with Justice Scalia’s opinion, is that the Free Exercise Clause mandates 
an exemption, but not one that judges can enforce, because judges need
manageable principles. 
6. See Steven D. Smith, Kent Greenawalt’s Elusive Constitution, 25 CONST.
COMMENT. 301, 305–06 (2008). 
7. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Indeterminacy and the Establishment Clause, 25 
CONST. COMMENT. 279 (2008). 
8. See Garnett, supra note 5, at 275.  Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. and Nelson Tebbe 
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of more flexible interpretative approaches that
allow relatively full consideration of factors at the expense of determinate guidance.  See 
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Establishment and Judicial Administrability, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 259
(2008); Nelson Tebbe, Eclecticism, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 317 (2008).  As Professor Bellia 
points out, I actually support a significant number of categorical rules in respect
to nonestablishment.  See Bellia, supra, at 259–60. 
9. Garnett writes of following James B. Thayer’s proposal that judges correct 
only “clear mistake[s].”  See Garnett, supra note 5, at 275; see generally Lawrence Gene 
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (describing Thayer’s argument for the rule of clear mistake). 
10. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885, 890 (1990).  Congress aimed to undo
the practical effect of that case with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.  The Supreme Court has held that law unconstitutional as
applied to state restrictions, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), but has 
upheld its application to federal laws, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
11. Id. at 874–75, 890. 
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II. BROAD QUESTIONS ABOUT APPROACHES TO THE
RELIGION CLAUSES 
I shall first address the broader, more abstract, questions about how 
judges and scholars should develop theories for the religion clauses and
defend recommended resolutions of particular disputes.  I then turn to
what are desirable strategies for religion clause interpretation.  Along the 
way, I say a few words about particular subject areas, but these are for 
illustrative purposes.  I do not try to repeat or summarize the fuller
accounts in my earlier work.
I want to begin with a remote, very tangential, story.  Daisy and Dan
fall in love during their judicial clerkships and marry.  Daisy wants to 
teach, Dan to practice.  Daisy has offers to teach at a law school near
Washington, D.C., and a slightly more prestigious, more exciting, school 
in a small college town.  Because Washington, D.C., is so much better
for Dan’s practice in terms of interest and income, Daisy chooses the 
school there.  After she and Dan have two children, she is offered a 
position at a school in Colorado.  With a modest sacrifice in salary and 
interesting practice, Dan could relocate to Denver.  Both Daisy and Dan 
love skiing and believe Colorado is beautiful and a healthy environment 
for children.  She accepts the offer. Five years later, she is asked to 
teach at a law school in Chicago with a faculty she greatly respects.  Dan
regards the possible move as slightly less desirable for his career, and 
Daisy and Dan agree that if they were thinking only of the children they
would stay put, but they are confident that their still young children 
could adjust comfortably to Chicago and flourish there.  She accepts the 
offer.  Two years later, she receives an attractive offer from a law school 
where she would love to teach.  Because it is located far from any city 
suitable for Dan’s practice and because keeping the family as a unit is 
very important to them, she refuses.  Three years later she receives an
offer from another school where she would greatly like to teach.  The 
city where that school is located would be fine for Dan’s practice.  But 
by now both children are teenagers and tightly connected to their friends 
and school. Daisy and Dan decide against disrupting the children.  Two 
years go by and a man Daisy and Dan have known well in Chicago 
becomes President of the United States.  Daisy is offered a Cabinet
position.  Recognizing that taking the position will create some family
hardship—moving the children at a less than ideal stage and interfering
with her ability to spend time with them—she and Dan nevertheless 
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conclude that she should not refuse, given her strong wish to help the 
new President, the extreme interest the position holds for her, and her 
sense that she may be able to provide valuable service for the national 
community. 
Daisy and Dan have made a series of employment decisions, taking
into account their professional aspirations, salaries, an attractive 
environment, a good location for children to grow, family unity, and 
avoidance of disruption.  If someone asked Daisy why she and Dan made 
particular decisions, she might have said: “It’s a school near a location 
that’s good for Dan and our family income”; “We love Colorado and we
believe it’s a fine place for children to grow”; “It’s a terrific school and
I’m looking forward to teaching there”; “I didn’t want to interfere with
Dan’s practice”; “We didn’t want to uproot the kids at this stage of their
lives”; and, “This was a unique opportunity I couldn’t refuse.”
The reasons Daisy gives at various stages as her explanations differ 
sharply, but at each stage she and Dan have taken into account a range of 
different kinds of considerations.  If they are typical, they will have 
neither any clear ordering nor a precise weighing of factors.  If the 
professional position is extremely attractive, as I am positing about the 
Cabinet position, they will make sacrifices in other respects that they 
would not make for a more modest professional advantage.  This is how 
most people with opportunities go through life.  Yet we do not suppose 
they are somehow incoherent or arbitrary in the way they make
decisions, though they have no system that either they or we as outsiders 
could identify.12 
It is, of course, a long way from this illustration to judges deciding 
major constitutional questions, even if we agree that Daisy and Dan may 
act coherently and sensibly while offering various explanations and
lacking any system.  Are decisions about public welfare radically different?
A county must decide whether to allow a ski resort to be built on public 
land.  The beauty and quiet of the mountains will be disturbed, yet the 
county will benefit economically and local skiers will welcome a place 
nearby to ski.  There is no simple equation to determine what to do if 
one rejects, as I do, the possibility that some formula, such as wealth 
maximization or greatest happiness utilitarianism, should be the 
exclusive guide.  Even those who accept such a possibility recognize that 
often the relevant future facts are so indeterminate that a decisionmaker
is reduced to crude intuitions about what is likely to happen.  Of course, 
with legislative decisions, one possible answer—the wrong one, I believe— 
12. I do not count listing pros and cons as itself a system. 
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is that legislators should do whatever the majority of citizens or constituents 
want.13 
A President’s decision whether to send many additional troops to 
Afghanistan raises more complex issues, ones about how to value great 
expense and lives sure to be lost against a possible increase in national 
security, not to mention the probable future of the Afghan people given 
various choices the United States might make.  We are aware that
President Obama and his advisors took a long time to make that decision
in late 2009, but few have suggested any systematic formula by which 
the decision should have been made. 
Legal decisions are different.  They are much more constrained by
authoritative sources.  Further, the hope and expectation is that these
sources are capable of leading the broad range of decisionmakers to the 
same results in the vast majority of instances.  Unlike some skeptics, I
believe this aspiration is realized within our legal system, and I believe it 
is realized even in respect to constitutional law.  When their resolution is 
really simple, issues tend not to reach the courts, and relatively easy 
questions are almost always settled in lower courts.  For the most part, 
the Supreme Court gets only hard issues,14 so uncertainty at that level is 
a terrible indicator of overall uncertainty.
Despite the reality of helpful guidance by authoritative sources,
troublesome questions can require an uncomfortable weighing of factors 
at various levels.  When the constitutional standard is general and open-
ended, as with the religion clauses, the Supreme Court may need to
consider a range of values and underlying principles to arrive at more 
specific constitutional tests for courts to apply in particular disputes. 
This was true for the way the Supreme Court constructed the Lemon
test15 for establishment cases and the pre–Employment Division v. Smith
test16 for free exercise cases.  For other kinds of problems, the move
from constitutional language to a practical test is more straightforward. 
13. This strategy would throw back on voters how they should decide whether to
favor a ski area, and were they to be good citizens, they would need somehow to assess 
how much weight they should give to their own preferences as compared with their sense 
of what is good for their fellow residents. 
14. However, a case with one or more hard issues may include some easy ones as
well.
15. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
16. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884–85. 
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Both free exercise and nonestablishment are at odds with obvious
discrimination that explicitly favors one religion over others. 
Once the Court has formulated it, a constitutional test may leave open 
an imprecise weighing of factors.  That the compelling interest free
exercise test did so was a substantial basis for the Court’s rejection of it 
in Employment Division v. Smith17—though Congress responded by
reinstituting the same standard with its Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act.18  Uncertainties about purpose, effect, and entanglement have underlain
strong objections to the Lemon test.  Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement” 
approach may seem more focused, but uncertainties about what behavior
constitutes endorsement greatly reduce its apparent simplicity.
One of the implicit messages of my books is that this deriving of tests 
from a multiplicity of relevant values works reasonably well in respect
to the religion clauses, as it does in respect to the Free Speech Clause
among other constitutional standards.  Further, the more specific tests 
that the Supreme Court has devised provide adequate guidance for most 
cases, and some uncertainty at the edges is tolerable.  Critics contest my
position at both of these levels. 
III. RELIGIOUS PREMISES AND JUSTIFYING RELIGION’S
SPECIAL TREATMENT 
An important aspect of the claim that I fail to engage the genuine or 
best justification of the religion clauses is that it leaves me without any 
satisfactory answer to the “daunting challenge”19 of whether and why 
religion should be treated as special.  Our culture and law have long 
treated religion as special.  Yet it is said, from the standpoint of secular
reason, it is hard to see why religion should be favored or disfavored in 
relation to otherwise similar convictions or philosophies that are
not religious.  Some theorists have built upon this doubt a modern 
nondiscrimination theory of how the religion clauses should be interpreted.20 
One version of the attack on my stance is that if we accepted a religious 
justification for free exercise and nonestablishment, both the task of 
discerning religion’s special place and other issues about religious 
freedom would be simplified.  I believe things are more complicated. 
17. See id. at 883–85. 
18. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (2006)). 
19. This term is from Smith, supra note 2, at 1887. 
20. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007). 
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I want to say at the outset that I do not quarrel with the idea that in 
their history both freedom of religious conscience and ideas of
nonestablishment were largely the fruits of religious conceptions of
God’s relation to human beings and their political institutions.  John 
Locke and James Madison, for example, relied substantially on religious 
convictions.  Although I believe the historical story also includes secular 
Enlightenment ideas, as well as the political reality of diverse religious 
perspectives in the American colonies, I accept the prominence of
religious roots for our conceptions of the relation of government to
religion. 
I welcome scholars and others pointing out these religious roots and
further claiming that the most powerful justifications for both free 
exercise and nonestablishment still lie in religious understanding.  John 
Garvey has urged that the soundest justification for free exercise is 
religious,21 and Steven Shiffrin’s recent book, The Religious Left and 
Church-State Relations, makes a strong argument that disestablishment
is desirable largely because it is healthy for religion.22 
My contention is that if Supreme Court Justices and other judges rely 
directly on religious premises, then that in itself amounts to a kind of 
establishment.  Perhaps nearly all religions converge on the premise that 
religion—or at least their religion—is special, but particular religions
will have different conceptions of proper relations between religion and 
the state.  For the vast majority of issues, judges cannot rely on religious 
premises writ large.  If they rely, it must implicitly or explicitly be on 
particular religious premises.  If we assume, as I do here, that their 
genuine bases for decisions should usually find their way into opinions, 
courts would, as one of our basic organs of government, be announcing
those premises as true or sound.  This is to reject competing religious 
premises as false or unsound.
Steven Smith argues that I have reasoned in a circular way in asserting 
that for a government to take positions on religious truth is to establish 
21. See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 42–57 (1996). 
22. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS LEFT AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
34–36 (2009).  Michael J. Perry has urged a religious basis for fundamental human
rights.  See Michael J. Perry, Morality and Normativity, 13 LEGAL THEORY 211 (2007).  I
believe the idea that all human beings, regardless of capacity, are equal is difficult to 
defend on nonreligious grounds other than as a desirable premise for the political life of 
liberal democracies.
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religion.23  The steps to my conclusion involve two senses of “establish”: 
ordinary and constitutional.  If the government formally announces that 
Jesus Christ is the son of God,24 that is to make official that religious
proposition—to “establish” it in the common sense—even if no particular
Christian denominations are favored.  If the formal favoring of particular 
religious institutions over others is an unconstitutional establishment, it
is a very modest move—one I do not hesitate to take—to regard the 
formal favoring of particular religious propositions similarly.25  This  
conclusion by itself leaves open whether some religious propositions are 
so widely accepted in the United States, and so in accord with our
historical traditions, that governments may embrace or endorse them. 
One way to resist my argument against judicial reliance on religious 
truth is to claim that rather than resting on a perceived transcultural, 
transhistorical religious justification, the Supreme Court should refer to 
the religious justifications the Framers accepted as all or part of the basis 
for its own analysis.  Such an approach might be defended as part of an
account that treats original understanding as conclusive or gives it 
considerable weight. 
Given the application of the clauses to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the relevant original understanding would need to include 
the congressional enactors and the ratifiers of both the Bill of Rights and 
the later amendment.  Would we be able to find a common religious
justification, given that some of the First Amendment’s enactors and 
ratifiers were deists who placed little stock in traditional religions, while 
others were devout Christians, and that many enactors and ratifiers of the
original clauses approved of some degree of establishment within their 
own states? Would seeking the religious justifications provide modern 
Justices much help, in comparison with trying to determine more
directly what the Constitution’s drafters and adopters conceived as the 
range of free exercise and nonestablishment—an inquiry I regard as 
wholly appropriate?  I am very doubtful.
It helps to have in mind just what practical issues are posed in respect 
to the special treatment of religion.  Five of these are as follows: (1) are
religions exemptions from ordinary laws constitutionally required?;
 23. Smith, supra note 2, at 1893. 
24. I do not count presidential addresses, or choices about inauguration ceremonies, or
most statements by other individual officials as formal announcements in this context. 
Judicial opinions, as part of the law, are different.
 25. Noah Feldman, however would allow the government considerable latitude in 
taking religious positions.  See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-
STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (2005).
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(2) must any exemptions be extended to analogous nonreligious claims?; 
(3) what may government, including public schools, proclaim as true?; 
(4) when may religious organizations be favored over other similar 
organizations?; and (5) when must religious organizations be refused 
benefits given to nonreligious ones? 
As a very rough approximation we might conclude that the original 
intent on the first question was uncertain; that the Founders did not
envision compelled equal treatment for analogous nonreligious claims; 
that they would have regarded approval of nondenominational Protestantism 
as fine—certainly that was the message of most nineteenth-century 
public schools in states with nonestablishment clauses; and that they
conceived whatever favorable or unfavorable treatment that was 
constitutionally required, or acceptable, concerning religious institutions, 
not organizations that were nonreligious but with similarities to religious 
ones.  I do not think that these attitudes would have changed very much
by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Would it help very much if we turned to religious justifications as 
conceived by the Framers?  We know that Locke, in defending free 
exercise and a degree of nonestablishment, did not think the government 
needed to exempt claims of religious conscience from generally 
applicable laws not themselves directed at religious practices.  With the 
historical effort to establish freedom of religious conscience, not many
religious believers in the eighteenth century had turned their attention to 
nonreligious conscience or possible discrimination in favor of one
nonreligious group over another.  A significant number of Protestants in
the late eighteenth century regarded the Pope as the antichrist and had a 
thoroughly negative opinion of Roman Catholicism.  Their religious 
convictions might have embraced freedom of worship for Catholics, but 
most would not have blinked at state endorsement of Protestantism 
against Roman Catholicism and other religious views. 
Rather than focusing on the practical implications the Founders 
themselves drew from their religious beliefs, we might ask what are the
fair implications of their most fundamental religious convictions.  Thus, 
we might suppose that someone with a strong religious conviction that a 
religious pacifist should not be compelled to join the military would 
probably conclude upon due reflection that were there genuine nonreligious
pacifists for whom such violence would be similarly abhorrent, they also 
should be excused.  And once Protestants acknowledged that Roman
Catholicism was a legitimate, though misguided, religious understanding,
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they would have foregone state sponsorship of Protestantism.  But this
kind of exercise brings us back to modern judges discerning and
highlighting central premises of citizens of an earlier time over their 
actual beliefs, a use of judgment not so different from what has seemed 
objectionable in accounts like mine.  In short, both because of their 
diversity and because of the dilemma of what to make of their historically 
contingent understandings, it is doubtful that a serious exploration of the 
religious justifications of enactors and ratifiers would help us much more 
than directly assessing what they took as the scope of free exercise and 
nonestablishment.  It is also doubtful whether either endeavor can resolve 
a great deal about modern controversies. 
Although I reject originalism—in both its textualist and intentionalist 
versions—as a complete theory of interpretation, I do think original 
understanding matters.26  As time elapses, more general principles of the
original understanding should have increasing importance in relation to 
views about specific practices, and the views of those with the greatest
insight should also increase in comparative importance.  This approach
does confer substantial latitude on modern judges, but I believe that is 
largely inevitable for open-ended constitutional clauses because the 
original understanding and what it implies for many modern practices is
so elusive in any event. 
IV. ECLECTIC APPROACHES AND THE LIMITS OF REASON
My own position about constitutional interpretation is fairly labeled 
“eclectic.”  I believe a range of considerations are relevant besides
original understanding, however that is conceived, and that no neat
ordering or precise method of weighing can be assigned.  Indeed, the
power of any one factor depends on the particular context and the
decisiveness with which it points in one direction in a particular case.
Among the relevant considerations beyond the applicable constitutional 
text are prior legal decisions and the principles they announce, traditions
26. I have written about this at somewhat greater length elsewhere, and I aim to do 
substantial work on statutory and constitutional interpretation over the next few years.
See Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 268 (Jules Coleman & Scott 
Shapiro eds., 2002).  In pointing out, in Religion and the Constitution: Establishment 
and Fairness, that much modern doctrine in many areas of constitutional law is not
consistent with originalism, I did not take that as necessarily showing the defects of 
originalism, only as demonstrating that failure to accord with original understanding
cannot be presented as a distinctive flaw in respect to religion clause doctrine. See 2 
GREENAWALT, supra note 1.
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within the country, contemporary values and understandings, the
implications of fundamental principles, and the desirability of standards 
that can give relatively clear guidance to judges and to citizens.  It is a
straightforward exercise to enumerate various issues in which my
conclusions do not align with conclusions that would place overarching 
importance on any one of these considerations.27  Whether my conclusions
are defensible or not, the basis for them is my conviction that all the
factors are relevant. 
A simple historical example in which fundamental premises should
have overridden existing law and more particular social assumptions was
the status of Christian blasphemy.  Once the legitimacy of non-Christian 
religions was recognized, a law making only Christian blasphemy a
crime should have been treated as an impermissible establishment.  That 
would have left open the options of having no crime of blasphemy or a 
crime that treats blasphemies of other faiths similarly—although the
latter option is at odds with the modern law of free speech and free 
exercise.  More controversially, perhaps, I think courts in the nineteenth
century that recognized promotion of Protestant Christianity in public 
schools as inappropriate were correct.  It is on such a basis that I conclude 
the words “under God” ideally do not belong in a Pledge of Allegiance 
required for public school classrooms, a practice that should now be
accepted as constitutional only upon a judgment that at this time a 
contrary decision would be highly counterproductive.
A relatively narrow issue about which achieving manageable standards 
has seemed determinative to me is public high school teachers
explaining their own religious positions in some depth and encouraging 
classroom debates about the truth and soundness of various religions.28 
For the great majority of high school classes, students will not easily
discount teacher explanations as the mere opinions of individuals, and 
both those and classroom debates may often have the effect of putting 
down minority views.  Though believing that in some high school classes 
explanations and discussions would not do any damage, I suggest an
absolute restriction because it is too hard for teachers, school
27. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 2, at 1898–1903. 
28. See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 1, at 125–29; see also Bellia, supra note 8, at 
260–61 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of an absolute rule for this and
other issues). 
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administrators, and judges to distinguish acceptable circumstances from
unacceptable ones. 
Although the balance of factors strikes me as yielding one result or 
constitutional test rather than another, typically I do not suppose I can
demonstrate that a person who comes out differently is wrong.
This leads me to the criticism of my reasoning process.  How does our 
reason really work?  Sometimes we believe that a careful chain of reasoning 
can show that one position is much more convincing than its competitor.
I believe this is true about whether the Federal Establishment Clause was
only a protection of state decisions whether to have their own religious 
establishments.  The language of the Clause alone seemed clearly to
preclude Congress from establishing Presbyterianism as the official 
religion of the to-be-created District of Columbia—an area that was to
lie outside the territory of any state.  I believe reason also establishes a
proposition I have mentioned earlier: if government cannot establish any 
official church—or favor one church over all others—it cannot proclaim
as true a religious doctrine that is embraced by one or two churches to 
the exclusion of others.  Congress cannot proclaim, for example, that the 
true significance of communion is transubstantiation.
But very often, reason does not work this way and does not get us to 
the end of the line.  We survey the reasons on each side.  In respect to 
graduation prayers at public schools, we can say that the mild endorsement 
of a particular form of religious practice and the pressure on and offense
to those who do not subscribe to the underlying premises point toward
invalidation;29 the sense of many parents and children that some
recognition of God’s presence enriches this highly significant marking 
of the completion of one of life’s vital stages counts toward allowing the
prayer.  I do not believe there is some process of reasons that settles 
which side is stronger.  I have a similar view of the complicated reasons 
for and against aid given on a neutral basis that nonetheless supports the 
religious functions of nonpublic schools.  For these and many other 
matters, all I can honestly say is that the reasons on one side seem to be 
stronger than the reasons on the other.  If we realize we are at such a 
point, we rely on our intuitive judgments—judgments influenced by our 
cultural heritage, particular upbringing, and professional training. 
Steven Smith correctly points out that in general I come down on the 
“progressive” side, which I take to include fairly strong positions in 
favor of free exercise protection and nonestablishment.  Is it a coincidence 
29. This group includes some deeply religious people who are opposed to what 
they see as watered-down religion. 
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that I was raised as a Protestant, my father strongly opposed hierarchy
within religious organizations, and he was strongly separationist in his
convictions?  Almost certainly not.  Does it make any difference that I 
am now a poorly observant Protestant whose view of Christian faith has 
been substantially influenced by the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr,
tempered by life experiences in which I have been deeply moved by the 
caring goodness of those close to me?  Almost certainly so.  I have tried
to provide an analysis that does not depend directly on these various 
influences, but I would be incredibly naïve to suppose I had banished 
them from affecting my judgment. 
Given all this, perhaps it would be better to line up the reasons, say
there are good arguments on each side, and leave the reader to decide.
This is often a good approach when one is teaching students, but it is a 
kind of author’s evasion, not welcomed by most readers, to withhold 
one’s own sense about the balance of reasons.  Thus, what a critic might 
label “bald pronouncements,” I prefer to regard as my intuitive sense of 
the stronger side of an argument, one that I admittedly cannot show 
convincingly to be correct. 
For what it is worth, on this issue I would not do better if I directly 
employed my religious convictions.  They do not typically yield more 
decisive answers to the sorts of questions that are involved than the sort 
of “detached” reasoning one expects of judges and of scholars who are
considering what judges should decide.  No doubt, certain other religious 
convictions applied directly would yield more determinative answers to
some problems, but I doubt that this is generally true if one sought 
guidance from the religious convictions of those who enacted the
constitutional provisions or if one sought a kind of amalgam of modern
religious convictions in the United States.
V. SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR RELIGION
My approach leaves ample room to believe religion deserves special
treatment.  Such treatment is provided in the First Amendment’s text: it 
fits with both the religious convictions of most of our population and 
with the perception of any sensitive observer that religion has, over the 
course of human history, made strong claims on participants and deeply 
influenced their sense of what really matters in human life.  All this does 
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not require reliance on the truth of any religious conviction or on a 
religious justification of the religion clauses.30 
When I have written that it will not matter much if the best justifications
for the religion clauses lie in a religious perspective and that judges must
rely on justifications that do not depend on religion, I am not supposing 
that all conceivable justifications will yield the same results; that would 
be silly.  But I do not think it is crucial whether one starts from a 
premise that some religion carries the truth, or that religion in general is
valuable, or instead starts with the nature of religion and its place in 
American life, with most of our citizens regarding religious ideas and 
organizations as deeply significant and valuable.  These truths are sufficient 
to sustain constitutionally required exemptions, treat teaching religion in 
public schools differently from teaching other ideas, bar judicial resolutions 
of religious doctrine, and permit a priest-penitent privilege that is more 
absolute than other privileges not to disclose confidential information. 
Whether grants of exemptions to religious claims of conscience should,
and must, be extended to nonreligious claims is more debatable. I
conclude that if particular kinds of individual nonreligious claims of 
conscience are common and truly analogous to religious ones, and if 
they do not present added dangers of fraud, they should be treated
comparably. 
Although I have written about “fairness” in relation to religion and the
state, I do not perceive that as barring a jurisdictional approach, as 
conceiving some domains within our society, notably including churches
and similar institutions of other religions, as largely outside the scope of 
state authority.  Some doctrines I defend are best seen in these terms,
and Richard Garnett and Paul Horwitz have presented strong arguments 
why such a conception should play a larger role than I have accorded 
it.31 
30. Some might say that relying on the importance of religion in people’s lives is a
kind of religious justification.  If so, it is a kind of religious justification I embrace.  It 
may fairly be said that my approach assumes a kind of “free church” understanding of the
relation of church and state. See Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Requiem for the Establishment
Clause, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 309–10, 316 (2008).  I believe both that that understanding, a
version that leaves open what internal government within religions should be, is part of 
our constitutional heritage and that for most circumstances it is healthy for religions, 
even those like Roman Catholicism and Anglicanism that traditionally have conceived a
closer connection of religion to government. 
31. See Garnett, supra note 5, at 275; Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the 
Church, 4 J. CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT 59 (2007); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First
Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 
(2009); Horwitz, supra note 5, at 289–90. 
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Of course, drawing the line between religion and nonreligion, between
religious institutions and nonreligious institutions, is complicated.  In 
most actual instances, there is little doubt, but as with most social
categorizations, difficult borderline cases arise.  I support an approach 
that does not involve necessary and sufficient conditions, but asks 
whether the disputed instance is similar to undisputed, core examples of 
religion. 
Although I may not have made this adequately clear, I believe 
borderline instances should be examined in light of the reasons why
religion is treated as special.32  Thus, the religion clauses and the reasons 
underlying them should influence categorizations to a considerable 
degree.  Still, I do not think phenomena that fall outside any ordinary
sense of “religious,” such as atheism, Marxism, and Benthamite
utilitarianism, should be treated as religious on the basis of a moral or 
legal judgment that equality of treatment with standard religions is
warranted in some respect.  A constitutional judgment that atheists who 
are genuine pacifists should be treated like religious pacifists should be 
based on demands of equality derived from the religion clauses themselves 
and the Equal Protection Clause, not upon a preliminary conclusion that 
these convictions are, after all, religious views within the meaning of the 
religion clauses.33 
VI. PERVASIVE SKEPTICISM
Given all that I admit about the limits of reason, do I have any basis to 
resist a thoroughgoing skepticism about constraints on legal decisions?  I
believe, given accepted traditions of judgment, that it is only in difficult
cases that one can think of the reasons on each side as being fairly
equally balanced.  And even then judges are not simply left to implement
their own particular visions of desirable political life; they are constrained 
by authoritative legal sources, their sense of values dominant in the
culture, and what can fairly be drawn out of these sources.  Further,
32. Larry Alexander expresses doubt that my approach allows normative considerations 
to play a role.  See Larry Alexander, Kent Greenawalt and the Difficulty (Impossibility?) 
of Religion Clause Theory, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 243, 244 (2008).
33. To be somewhat more precise, atheism is undoubtedly a view about religion. 
The Free Exercise Clause guarantees a right to reject all religious views, and the 
Establishment Clause protects against some forms of government favoritism towards 
religion over its rejection.
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although one cannot expect universal agreement about any of the competing 
approaches to religious freedom, the nature of religion and liberal 
democracy can provide guidance, with concepts like fairness and neutrality
playing significant roles.  Is there room for judgment and disagreement?
Yes.  Does that mean that all we have in the final analysis are the personal
political preferences of judges?  I do not think so. 
A somewhat different form of skepticism, one that is more modest, 
does not challenge the possibility of coherence but claims that the Supreme
Court’s decisions in this area are radically irreconcilable.  Because any 
answer to this criticism demands close analysis of many cases, I will not 
repeat here my response to that form of skepticism.34 
VII. PRACTICAL CONCERNS
This brings us to the very serious practical responses to the complexity 
and the degree of indeterminacy that I suggest: judges need simpler, 
more absolute principles and rules, or they should defer to the political 
branches.  These questions touch virtually all constitutional protection of
individual rights, not only the religion clauses.
The proposal for more straightforward and absolute principles and 
rules could be made about the underlying approaches to determining
concrete constitutional standards.  A kind of pure textualism, focusing 
either on original meaning or what the text conveys in ordinary language 
today, might be proposed as such an alternative.  Without delving deeply
into theories of constitutional interpretation, I shall say only that such an
approach omits too much that should be relevant. 
A more appealing argument for simplicity is in respect to matters that 
lie closer to the surface of decision—the governing standards courts are 
to apply and perhaps principles that lie immediately behind these.  A
rule of “no government teaching of religious truth,” backed by a broader 
principle against government sponsorship of religious views, would 
qualify in this respect.  As some critics have noted, I actually support a
number of concrete standards that are relatively precise,35 but I also 
support a substantial burden-compelling interest standard for free 
exercise exemptions and an inquiry into whether government displays of 
34. Frederick Mark Gedicks defends his thesis that Supreme Court decisions have 
rested on two incompatible approaches against my suggestions about reconciliations. 
See Gedicks, supra note 7, at 279–83. 
35. See Bellia, supra note 8, at 260–62; Marc DeGirolami, Tragic Minimalism: A 
Theory of Religious Liberty (May 2010) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia 
Law School) (on file with author).  I think some of these standards flow directly from the
best understanding of the religion clauses; others are called for by judicial manageability. 
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religious symbols—such as crèches—do support a religious view or are 
dominantly secular.  These inquiries are complex.  Executive officials 
and lower courts may disagree about applications, and affected individuals 
and citizens may not know what courts will decide. 
We can conceive the uncertainty problem as involving indeterminacy
about resolution by the Supreme Court, variations among lower courts, 
and inadequate guidance to citizens and officials about what is required 
and permitted. The cost of uncertainties of these kinds varies tremendously 
among different subjects of legal standards; the costs, whatever they are, 
need to be compared with those of the alternatives.36  My present sense
is that the costs in the areas I have noted are not particularly great. 
Very few situations are even litigated, and an extremely small percentage
will rise to the Supreme Court.  Indeterminacy about what the Court will
or would decide is not of overarching significance in and of itself.  As 
far as free exercise exemptions are concerned, the only plausible 
alternative to a balancing approach is to deny exemptions across the
board, the result in Employment Division v. Smith.  Unless altered by 
legislation, that alternative is worse for prisoners and others who seek
accommodations than is a flexible balancing approach, and given the
deference to official judgments denying exemptions,37 the balancing 
approach’s uncertainty does not impose an undue hardship on officials. 
Something similar may be said about public displays of religious
symbols.  In considering the virtue of clear rules, it helps to remember
that in some local communities, very clear nonestablishment rules laid 
down by the Supreme Court, such as no oral prayer by public school 
teachers and their classes, have been disobeyed without formal
complaint.  The fact that lower courts will reach different conclusions 
from each other about borderline situations is moderately troubling, but
the resulting differential treatment is not a major social problem, and
those raising constitutional claims will certainly prefer occasional 
uncertainty to rules that render their claims totally ineffective.
36. See Bellia, supra note 8, at 259–61; Tebbe, supra note 8, at 317, 319–20. 
37. The deference is especially great for prison officials.  See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
544 U.S. 709, 717, 723 (2005).  Given the latitude that these officials have, it will be an 
unusual circumstance when an accommodation that falls within the bare minimum that a 
court would demand will cause genuine interference with prison operations. 
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An approach that involves very substantial deference to the political
branches is one kind of clear rule or principle,38 and it shows respect for 
the judgments of elected branches. 
What should courts do if legislatures and the executive branch, 
politically responsible to the electorate, have adapted measures that one 
might reasonably defend as constitutional?  My bottom line here is that
in respect to many constitutional guarantees, political actors, ranging 
from legislators to prison officials, are not sufficiently to be trusted to 
respect unpopular, idiosyncratic claims of rights.39  We need the extra
protection that courts that are not highly deferential can provide.  Also
important, for most areas, is that courts provide extra protection for 
individual rights even if judges are no more favorable overall to those 
rights than are legislatures or executive officials.  That is because the
impairment of rights requires both legislative approval and court 
acceptance. This analysis holds true for most free exercise claims that do
not raise serious establishment problems.  Because impingements on free
exercise require legislative or executive action in the first place, active 
judicial review can only add to free exercise protection.  In respect to
possible establishments that do not raise serious competing free exercise
claims, judicial review of legislative and executive action can only 
contribute to nonestablishment.  Of course, when a court’s sustaining of 
an argument that rests on nonestablishment does impinge on free 
exercise, or vice versa, a judicial decision upholding the claim that the
political branches have acted unconstitutionally will either curtail free 
exercise or allow establishment to a greater degree than the legislature or
executive has chosen.  Although the “inevitable extra protection” 
argument does not apply simply to those situations, nevertheless,
given that religion clause claims are often raised by minorities, the basic
supposition that judges are more capable of giving a balanced appraisal 
holds even then. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
I have quickly surveyed some absolutely fundamental questions about
how the religion clauses should be understood. Whether or not the 
criticisms raised against my own approach have been phrased just as I
38. See Garnett, supra note 5, at 276–77. 
39. Before invoking James Bradley Thayer’s “clear mistake” approach, we do well 
to recall that his main practical concern was the Court’s substantive due process decisions
about economic regulation.  See James B. Thayer, Constitutional Law: The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
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would like them, they have demonstrated how contestable are many of
my underlying assumptions and conclusions.  My effort here has been to
explain some of these assumptions and conclusions, and suggest certain 
drawbacks to alternatives.  I have not provided decisive refutations of 
competing perspectives, but I hope I have helped clarify just what is at 
stake.
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